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THE RELATIVE BARGAINING POWER OF
EMPLOYERS AND UNIONS IN THE GLOBAL
INFORMATION AGE:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE UNITED
STATES AND JAPAN
Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt*
and
Benjamin C. Ellis**
ABSTRACT
In this paper, we examine and compare the impact of American and
Japanese labor law on the relative bargaining power of the labor and
management within the context of the new global economy based on
information technology. We begin by providing a simple economic definition
of bargaining power and examining how it can be influenced by economic and
legal factors. Next, we discuss the impact of new information technology and
the global economy on the employment relationship and how this has decreased
union bargaining power relative to management bargaining power. Finally, we
compare various facets of American and Japanese labor law that have a
significant impact on the parties' relative bargaining power and discuss how
one might expect American and Japanese unions to fare in their negotiations
with management in the new economic environment.
I. INTRODUCTION
Although implicit or explicit bargaining is a common means for resolving
differences among the various stakeholders of the modem corporation, perhaps
the quintessential expression of this phenomenon is collective bargaining
between representatives of employees and management over the terms and
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conditions of employment. The resolution of disputes through private
bargaining has the great benefit of being a decentralized method of problem
solving in which the parties who are directly affected by the problem, and know
the most about it, determine the solution. Although bargaining solutions are
undoubtedly influenced by information and the parties' conceptions of
"fairness,"' bargaining is not a detached inquiry into either "truth" or "justice."2
Instead, the determination of issues through bargaining is largely determined
by the relative "bargaining power" of the two parties, or their ability to force the
other side to accept an agreement on their terms.
The rise of the global economy based on information technology has done
much to shift the relative bargaining power of labor and management in favor
of management. New information technology has allowed the organization of
firms on a global basis for production, sub-contracting and sales. In the United
States, "outsourcing" work to lower-paid foreign workers has become not only
good business judgment, but a necessary strategy to compete with goods and
services from lower wage countries. In this new economic environment,
employers place a high premium on flexibility in production and employment,
and the employment relationship is subject to the market in ways that have not
previously been experienced. This decreases union bargaining power by
putting downward pressure on wages and limiting the parties' ability to make
long-term contractual commitments.4
Law can also influence the relative bargaining power of labor and
management. The law can raise labor's bargaining power relative to
management's by: facilitating broad organization across industries or the
economy; allowing unions a broad array of economic weapons to employ
against employers such as strikes, secondary strikes, and consumer boycotts; or
limiting employers' ability to respond to a strike by prohibiting discharges and
permanent replacements.5 Alternatively, the law might lower union bargaining
power relative to employers' by limiting employee organization and economic
weapons or allowing greater employer response or economic weapons.6
1. See generally Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, A Bargaining Analysis of American Labor
Law and the Search for Bargaining Equity and Industrial Peace, 91 MICH. L. REv. 419(1992)
[hereinafter Dau-Schmidt, A Bargaining Analysis].
2. NLRB v. Ins. Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 507 (1960) (finding collective
bargaining substitutes "processes ofjustice for the more primitive method of trial by combat.")
(quoting Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 488 (1921) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting)).
3. PETER CAPPELLI, THE NEW DEAL AT WORK: MANAGING THE MARKET DRIVEN
WORKFORCE 74 (1999).
4. See generally Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Employment in the New Age of Trade and
Technology: Implications for Labor and Employment Law, 76 IN. L.J. 1 (2001) [hereinafter
Dau-Schmidt, Employment in the New Age].
5. Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt & Arthur R. Traynor, Regulating Unions and Collective
Bargaining, in 2 LABOR AND EMPLoymENT LAW AND EcoNoMIcs (Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt et
al. eds., 2009).
6. Id.
2 [Vol. 20:1
THE RELATIVE BARGAINING POWER OF EMPLOYERS
American and Japanese labor laws have their roots in the same New Deal
principles of the American Wagner Act; however, these laws have developed in
significantly different ways that influence the parties' relative bargaining power
with the adoption of the Taft-Hartley amendments in the United States and
various amendments and doctrines in Japan.
This article will examine and compare the impact of American and
Japanese labor law on the relative bargaining power of labor and management
within the context of the new global economy based on information technology.
We will begin by providing a simple economic definition of bargaining power
and examine how it can be influenced by economic and legal factors. Next, we
will discuss the impact of new information technology and global economy on
the employment relationship and how this has decreased union bargaining
power relative to management. Finally, we will compare various facets of
American and Japanese labor law that have a significant impact on the parties'
relative bargaining power and discuss how one might expect American and
Japanese unions to fare in their negotiations with management in the new
economic environment.
H. BARGAINING POWER
Although bargaining is a very complex phenomenon depending on the
underlying cost structures, information, and strategy, economists have sought to
develop simple yet useful models of collective bargaining. Almost all of these
models focus on bilateral negotiations between the union and an employer over
the single facet of wages. Although these models are clearly mere caricatures of
the phenomenon, they offer insights into the process of collective bargaining
and the concept of bargaining power that are relevant to the impact of economic
factors and the law on collective bargaining.
"Bargaining power" has been defined as the ability to induce an opponent
to accept an agreement on one's own terms.9 In economic terms, a party's
bargaining power depends on that party's ability to impose costs on the other
side for failure to reach agreement while minimizing the party's own costs of
disagreement.10 In collective bargaining, the union's bargaining power depends
on its ability to inflict costs on the employer through lost sales from a strike or
other collective action while minimizing the costs of the collective action to
their membership in lost wages and jobs." The employer's bargaining power
7. See generally I THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW (John E. Higgins, Jr. et al. eds., 5th ed.
2006); KAZUO SUGENO, JAPANESE LABOR LAW (Leo Kanowitz trans., U. of Wash. Press 1992)
(1985).
8. See generally BRUCE E. KAUFMAN & JuUE L. HOTcHKISs, THE EcoNOMICS OF LABOR
MARKETS (7th ed. 2005).
9. See Neil W. Chamberlain, A General Theory of Economic Process 81 (1955).
10. See generally Kaufman & Hotchkiss, supra note 8.
11. Id.
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depends on its ability to minimize its costs from the collective action 2 while
maximizing the costs of the collective action on the union members.' 3
Accordingly, in collective bargaining, the parties' relative bargaining
power depends on economic factors such as the nature of the firm's product
(whether it is perishable or can be stockpiled); the firm's technology of
production (whether production requires a lot of workers or great skill or can be
done with easily obtainable low skill replacements or a skeleton crew of
defectors and managers); general economic conditions (whether there is
currently great demand for the employer's good or a small supply of potential
replacement workers); the structure of bargaining (large unions can generally
support a strike longer than small employers, while large employers can
generally resist a strike longer than small unions); and the employees'
commitment to collective action (whether employees will defect and cross the
picket line).14 If these factors favor the union and it has relatively greater
bargaining power, the union will have a greater ability to negotiate terms and
conditions of employment that favor its members. However, if these factors
favor the employer and it has relatively greater bargaining power, the employer
will have a greater ability to determine the terms and conditions of employment
in negotiations. 15
The relative bargaining power of the parties to collective bargaining will
also depend on the laws that govern a country's system of labor relations. A
government might enact legislation to try to affect the relative bargaining power
of unions and employers in order to raise or lower negotiated wages and
achieve a more equitable distribution of the proceeds from production.16 For
example, a government might limit or prohibit the use of permanent
replacements if it wants to lower the potential costs of strikes to employees and
raise union bargaining power and wages. Similarly, a government might
prohibit employer lockouts to lower employers' ability to impose costs on
employees for not agreeing, thereby lowering employer bargaining power and
raising union wages. Alternatively, if the government thinks unions are too
powerful, it might outlaw secondary boycotts to lower the unions' ability to
impose costs on employers for not agreeing and lower union bargaining power
and wages.'7 This was, in fact, one of the purposes behind the prohibition on
secondary boycotts enacted in the Taft-Hartley amendments to the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA). To the extent that a nation's labor laws raise or
12. An example would be stockpiling their product or operating with replacements.
13. KAUFMAN & HoTCHKuss, supra note 8. Examples of employer actions that would
increase the costs of collective action on union members would include: discriminating against
union supporters and using permanent replacements in a strike.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Dau-Schmidt & Traynor, supra note 5.
17. Id.
18. See Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Martin H. Malin, Roberto L. Corrada, Christopher David
Ruiz Cameron, Catherine L. Fisk, Labor Law in the Contemporary Workplace (2009) at 67.
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lower union bargaining power relative to employer bargaining power, such
regulation will also encourage or discourage employee organizing as it raises
and lowers the expected benefits relative to its costs.19
Thus, it is inevitable that the recent changes in the global economy and
differences in American and Japanese labor law would have an impact on the
relative bargaining power of labor and management in these countries.
Ill. THE GENERAL DECLINE IN RELATIVE BARGAINING POWER FOR
EMPLOYEES IN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES IN THE NEW GLOBAL ECONOMY OF
THE INFORMATION AGE
During the 1970s, the post-war system of trade and technology that
served as the foundation for the system of industrial unionism began to
change.20 With the rebuilding of Europe and the rise of the "Asian tigers,"
international trade began to make serious inroads into the American economy.
The impact of international trade was first felt in low-capital industries such as
textiles and shoes, but the oil crisis of the 1970s facilitated si ificant inroads
into even the capital-intensive automotive and steel industries. After the price
of oil quadrupled in the 1973 OPEC embargo, the automotive and steel
manufacturers in Europe and Asia enjoyed competitive advantages through fuel
efficient desiF2s, up-to-date production facilities, superior management, and
lower wages. Manufacturing jobs began to migrate to low wage countries or
disappear entirely as industry strived to become more efficient.23 As a result,
global trade played a more important role in the economies of all industrialized
24
countries.
During the 1980s, new information technology accelerated globalization
and allowed for the efficient horizontal organization of firms. Information
technology allowed employers to coordinate production among various
suppliers and subcontractors around the world. Employers no longer had to be
large and vertically integrated to ensure efficient production; they just had to be
sufficiently wired to reliable subcontractors.25 The "best business practices"
became those of horizontal organization, outsourcing, and subcontracting, as
firms concentrated on their "core competencies"--or that portion of production
or retailing that they did best.26 In this economic environment, employers
sought flexibility in employment; the number of "contingent employees" who
19. Dau-Schmidt & Traynor, supra note 5.
20. CAPPELLI, supra note 3, at 4-5.
21. Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, The Changing Face of Collective Representation: The
Future of Collective Bargaining, 82 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 903, 912 (2007) [hereinafter Dau-
Schmidt, The Changing Face].
22. Id.
23. Id. at 913.
24. Id.
25. CAPPELLI, supra note 3, 99-100.
26. Id
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work part-time or are leased or sub-contracted reached new heights in the
American economy.27 The new horizontal organization of firms broke down
the job ladders and administrative rules of the internal labor market, and firms
became more market driven. New technology allowed "bench-marking," or the
checking of the efficiency of a division of a firm against external suppliers, thus
bringing the market inside the firm in a way not previously experienced.28
Perhaps the most extreme example of a horizontal method of production is the
Volkswagen truck plant in Resende, Brazil, where the employees of various
subcontractors gather under one roof to assemble trucks using parts
manufactured from around the world, and only a handful of actual Volkswagen
employees are present to perform quality control.29
New information technology also facilitated the rise of the "biA box"
retailers to a position of unprecedented world-wide economic power. The
simple bar code allowed Wal-Mart to master inventory control, coordinate
sources of product supply world-wide, and grow into an international economic
powerhouse with unprecedented power to determine wholesale prices and
employment.3 1 This power in the retail market allows the "big box" retailers to
determine the wages and employment of production employees, even though
they bear no legal relation to those employees.32 For example, in 1995 when
the American firm Rubbermaid sought to raise its prices to cover an increase in
the cost of plastic resin, Wal-Mart's refusal to comply resulted in wage cuts and
layoffs for Rubbermaid's production workers. 33 Moreover, the "big box"
retailers provide an extensive retailing network for foreign producers,
facilitating the inroads of foreign production into the American economy and
across the world. In the case of Rubbermaid, important parts of the firm's
production process were eventually sold to China for employment there.34
Finally, in the 1990s, the global labor market experienced a near doubling
of the relevant labor force with a concomitant downward pressure on wages and
benefits that is yet to be fully felt in the industrialized world. Since 1990, the
collapse of communism, India's turn from autarky, and China's adoption of
market capitalism have lead to an increase in the global economy's available
27. Karen Winegardner, Who Are Your Employees? Contingent Workers on the Rise, THE
CAPrrAL, Apr. 1, 2001, at 10. For an example of the contingent worker marketplace in action,
see Melanie Holmes, Confronting the Coming Talent Crunch (May 15, 2009),
http://www.us.manpower.com/webinars/5_15_07_slides.pdf (Manpower placed 4.4 million
workers in 2006 alone); Manpower Inc., Profile, http://www.us.manpower.com/uscom/
contentSingle.jsp?articleid=297 (last visited Nov. 16, 2009).
28. CAPPELLI, supra note 3, at 104.
29. Id.
30. Dau-Schmidt, The Changing Face, supra note 21, at 914.
31. Id. at 913-14.
32. Id. at 914.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 914.
35. Id.
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labor force from 3.3 billion to 6 billion!35 Because these countries were
relatively capital poor, their entry into the global economy has brought no
corresponding increase in global capital. As a result, the capital-to-labor ratio
in the global economy has dropped approximately forty percent.3 7 This abrupt
change in the ratio of available labor and capital in the global economy has put
tremendous downward pressure on wages and benefits in global competition.
Low wage competition from elsewhere in the world has contributed to
American employers' desire to subcontract work to low-wage countries and to
encourage the immigration of low-wage employees from Central and South
America.38 The downward pressure on wages and benefits exists not only in
manufacturing, but in any service in which work can be digitalized and sent to
qualified people elsewhere in the world. 39
As a consequence of these changes, unions in developed countries such
as the United States and Japan have generally suffered a significant decline in
their bargaining power relative to their employers. The efficient organization of
firms across the globe has decreased unions' ability to impose costs on
recalcitrant employers through collective action and increased the potential
costs of such action to employees. If American or Japanese workers go on
strike and their work can be subcontracted to low wage workers in other
countries, these workers can lose their job even if they are more productive and
produce higher quality output. Moreover, as firms have adopted a leaner, more
horizontal, form of organization that is more subject to market discipline, and
put a higher premium on flexibility in production, there has been less for
employees and employers to gain through collective bargaining. In the new
economic environment, employers are less interested in negotiating benefits and
administrative rules to support a long-term employment relationship, so there is
less for unions to achieve and administer through collective bargaining. The
result has been a precipitous decline in union bargaining power and activity in
both the United States and Japan.
IV. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF AMERICAN AND
JAPANESE LABOR LAW ON THE RELATIVE BARGAINING POWER OF THE
PARTIES TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
Despite their common heritage, there are several significant differences
between American and Japanese labor law and the practice of labor relations in
each country that would logically have an impact on the relative bargaining
power of labor and management.
36. Richard B. Freeman, America Works: Critical Thought on the Exceptional U.S. Labor
Market 12840 (2007).
37. Id. at 130.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 133.
40. Id. at 133-34.
2010] 7
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A. The Definition of Employee
In the United States, the NLRA uses the term "employee" to describe the
people who enjoy the right to organize and bargain collectively under that
statute.40  Although the NLRA's definition of employee includes "any
employee," it expressly exempts "independent contractors," "supervisors," and
employees covered by the Railway Labor Act.41 The United States' National
Labor Relations Board and courts have narrowll interpreted the term
"employee,"42 broadly interpreting the exceptions, and adding additional
exceptions for "managerial" and "confidential" employees." Under United
States' law, many professionals, and even employees with only minimal
supervisory responsibilities, are excluded from coverage under the Act.45
In contrast, Japanese labor law covers a broader array of economically
dependent people. In Japan, the term "workers" is used to describe persons
protected by the Labor Union Act (LUA), Japan's primary body of labor
laws.46 The Act defines "workers" as "those persons who live on their wages,
salaries, or other equivalent income, regardless of the kind of occupation.A7
Because this standard is not particularly effective in differentiating workers
from non-workers, legal commentators and courts often use a substitute
standard, asking whether an individual has a "subordinate relationship to an
employer." A commission established by the Minister of Labor determined
that identifying a worker under this definition includes two factors: "(1) the
rendering of service under the direction and supervision of another party; and
41. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2009).
42. Id. For employees covered by the Railway Labor Act, see 45 U.S.C § 151 (2009). The
NLRA defines supervisors at 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (2009). The independent contractor
exemption was added with the Taft-Hartley Amendments of 1947, overruling NLRB v. Hearst,
in which the U.S. Supreme Court considered workers who were not technically employees, but
were nonetheless economically dependent on a business for their livelihoods, as being protected
by the NLRA. See NLRB v. Hearst Publ'n, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 131 (1944).
43. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 113 (1956) (finding NLRA protection
available only to employees in the context of their employment with a particular employer).
44. NLRB v. Yeshiva, 444 U.S. 672, 682 (1980) (exempting employees who "formulate
and effectuate management policies by expressing and making operative the decisions of their
employer") (citation omitted); Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 348 N.L.R.B. 686, 694 (2006)
(exempting certain charge nurses under the 'supervisor' exception).
45. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co. Division, 416 U.S. 267 (1974) (exempting managerial
employees); NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Electric Membership Corp., 454 U.S. 170
(1981) (exempting confidential employees).
46. See NLRB v. Yeshiva, 444 U.S. 672,682 (1980); Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 348,694
N.L.R.B. 686 (2006).
47. Labor Union Act, Law No. 174 of 1949, available at
http://www.jil.go.jp/english/laborinfo/ library/documents/lljlaw2.pdf. In Leo Kanowitz'
translation of Kazuo Sugeno's treatise on Japanese labor law, he uses the term 'Trade Union
Law' when discussing the LUA. See generally SUGENO, supra note 7.
48. Labor Union Act, Law No. 174 of 1949, art. 3, available at
http://www.jil.go.jp/english/ laborinfolibrary/documents/lljlaw2.pdf.
49. SUGENO, supra note 7, at 425.
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(2) the receipt of remuneration in return for the service rendered.""9 Sugeno
identifies four factors:
(1) that the persons perform indispensable work for the
enterprise and that they are an essential component of the
enterprise; (2) that the content of their contracts are
unilaterally decided; (3) that they are supervised with regard to
such matters as the date, time and hour, the place, and the
method of accomplishing their work; and (4) that they are not
free to accept or refuse contracts relating to their employer's
business that are tendered by third persons. o
Though supervisors are excluded from membership in certified unions,
they are nonetheless considered to be "workers" under the Act.5 Additionally,
temporary workers are typically not admitted to unions. 52
Japanese labor law's broader coverage of economically dependent people
favors greater union bargaining power in Japan. With greater coverage,
Japanese unions would have a better opportunity to organize a larger percent of
employees in a given industry and the nation as a whole. Greater union density
helps protect union workers from non-union competition at least within the
country's borders. This broader coverage is both more and less important in the
new global economy. With the changes in production methods of information
technology, production is becoming more decentralized, and more employees
work for sub-contractors and exercise some degree of managerial or supervisory
skills. In the United States, the narrow definition of employee under the NLRA
has led to an ever larger share of the work force who are either excluded from
coverage under the NLRA, or left working for "employers" with no economic
leverage with the ultimate producer or retailer. On the other hand, with
50. Ryuichi Yamakawa, New Wine in Old Bottles: Employee/Independent Contractor
Distinction Under Japanese Labor Law, 21 CoMP. LAB. L. & PoL'Y J. 99, 104 (1999). The
commission further examined the nature of the relationship that qualifies for protection, noting
four factors: "(a) absence of freedom to refuse another party's request to engage in service; (b)
specific direction and supervision while performing service; (c) restriction in terms of time and
place for performing service; and (d) prohibition of delegation of duty to a person other than
him/herself ("insubstitutability")." Id. Lastly, there are a handful of supplemental factors to
consider:
(a) process of hiring that is virtually the same as that of regular employees; (b)
withholding tax treatment as an employee; (c) application of labor insurance
through the deduction or contribution of a premium under a scheme of worker's
compensation and unemployment insurance; (d) application of rules regarding
orders for a workplace or disciplinary actions; and (e) application of provisions
regarding severance allowances and fringe benefits.
Id. at 107.
51. SUGENO, supra note 7, at 426.
52. T.A. HANAMI, LABOR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN JAPAN 37 (1979).
Supervisors are simultaneously considered to be "employers." Id.
53. Id. at 103.
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increased international trade, national borders have proven much less important
in collective bargaining. Even if Japanese workers are protected under
Japanese labor law, they still have to bargain with employers who can shift
production to low-wage workers overseas.
B. Exclusive Representation
One of the major differences between U.S. and Japanese unions is the
individuals the unions are authorized and obligated to represent. In the United
States, a union is considered the "exclusive representative" for the "appropriate
bargaining unit" for which it has been certified.53 The role of a union as the
exclusive bargaining representative gives it both special rights and obligations.
First, the union is not only authorized, but is also obligated to bargain on behalf
of all employees of an employer whose positions fall within that unit,54 and it
must exercise that obligation fairly and without prejudice.55 Unlike most
violations of U.S. labor laws, a union that fails to fairly represent its members
may be liable under civil law in addition to the administrative remedies of the
NLRB. However, with this responsibility comes the power of exclusive
representation. While the union remains certified, no other organization may
represent the unit or bargain with the employer on their behalf.57 Any other
union seeking to represent a unit covered by a certified union will be in
violation ofNLRA section 8(b)(4)(C). Furthermore, at least in states that have
not passed "right to work" laws, a certified union is free to bargain for a union
security agreement, which requires the payment of union agency fees as a
condition of continued employment.58
By contrast, Japanese unions are authorized to bargain only on behalf of
their members. 59 Additionally, the LUA contains only a limited exclusivity
provision, which provides: "When three-fourths or more of the workers of the
same kind regularly employed in a particular factory or workplace come under
application of a particular collective agreement, the agreement concerned shall
also apply to the remainin workers of the same kind employed in the factory
concerned or workplace." Similarly,
54. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2009).
55. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2009).
56. E.g., Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192,203 (1944) (explaining that
the bargaining representative has "the duty to exercise fairly the power conferred upon it in
behalf of all those for whom it acts, without hostile discrimination against them").
57. Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n Local Union No. 6, 493 U.S. 67, 84
(1989) (asserting jurisdiction over such matters under 28 U.S.C. § 1337).
58. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2009).
59. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (2009); ALviN L. GoLDMAN, LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW IN
THE UNTED STATES 176 (1996).
60. Labor Union Act, Law No. 174 of 1949, art. 6, available at
http://www.jil.go.jp/english/ laborinfo/library/documents/lljlaw2.pdf.
61. Id. at art. 17.
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When a majority of the workers of the same kind in a
particular locality come under application of a particular
collective agreement, the Minister of Health, Labor, and
Welfare or the prefectural governor may, at the request of
either one or both of the parties to the collective agreement
concerned and, pursuant to a resolution of the Labor Relations
Commission, decide that the collective agreement ... should
apply to the remaining workers of the same kind employed in
the same locality and to their employers.61
The absence of an exclusivity or appropriate unit provision in Japanese
labor law has resulted in the rise of plural unions. This means that unlike the
United States, multiple organizations may arise to represent workers from a
single class within a single workplace.
Exclusive representation has proven to be both a blessing and a curse for
American unions. Exclusivity simplifies representation and bargaining issues
and provides insulation from competitive unions entering the bargaining unit.62
However, the elections procedure the United States adopted to determine
representation in bargaining units has proven to be a significant burden to
employee organization.63 As a result, it is more difficult for U.S. unions to
achieve a high level of union density in an industry to "take wages out of
competition." This is particularly true given Japan's rule that non-union
employees in the same locality or industry are governed by the terms of relevant
collective bargaining agreements if the relevant unions achieve majority or two-
thirds representation. As a result, the doctrine of exclusive representation
probably undermines the bargaining power of American unions in the early
stages of labor organization in a region or industry, although it may enhance
union bargaining power for well established unions.
C. Employee Collective Action
In the United States, the employees' right to engage in collective action to
pressure employers to meet their demands and grievances is set forth in the
NLRA's section 7. It is from section 7 that employees derive their rights to
62. Id. at art. 18.
63. Dau-Schmidt, A Bargaining Analysis, supra note 1, at 503-04.
64. This has resulted in the recent passage of the Employee Free Choice Act of 2007, H.R.
800, 110th Cong. (as passed by House, March 1, 2007), which permits, among other things, the
use of authorization cards to support demands for union recognition. See id. at § 2(a)(6). In
support of its campaign for the Act, the AFL-CIO claims to have research showing that 60
million U.S. workers would join a union if they could. AFL-CIO, Employee Free Choice Act,
http://www.aflcio.org/joinaunion/voiceatwork/efca/57million.cfm (last visited Nov. 5, 2009).
65. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2009) ("Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities ... and shall also have the right to refrain
from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an
2010] 11I
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unionize and bargain collectively. In addition to these explicit rights,
employees have the right to "engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection . . . ."65
These broad rights are explicitly bounded by the provisions of sections
8(b) through (g).66 Prohibited tactics include restraint or coercion of
employees' section 7 rights, invidiously causing an employer to discriminate
against an employee on the basis of his non-union status, refusal to bargain
collectively and in good faith, and the under-taking of "secondary-boycotts"
that are aimed at inducing a "secondary employer" to pressure the "primary
employer" to recognize or negotiate with a union.6 7 In addition to this broad
prohibition on secondary boycotts, the NLRB has held that partial work-
stoppages or slow-downs are unprotected activities under the NLRA and
employees who engage in them can be fired. 68
In Japan, many labor rights stem from Constitutional provisions. While
both the U.S. and Japanese Constitutions guarantee a right to free association
the Japanese Constitution further provides "the right and obligation to work,"6
and "[t]he right of workers to organize and bargain and act collectively." 70
Furthermore, in Japan there is no section analogous to the NLRA section 8
unfair labor practices for labor organizations; instead, the Japanese employ a
concept of "justifiable acts" judged in context. Nonetheless, there are some
narrow and specific exceptions.
In Japan, the propriety of disputed acts are generally made on a case-by-
case basis. Generally, four elements will be examined in determining whether
collection action is justifiable: "(1 their parties, (2) their objectives, (3) their
procedures, and (4) their means."7  Dispute rights must be balanced against the
agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as
authorized in [29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3)].").
66. Id. Employees also have the ability to refrain from any of these rights. Id For a
concise discussion of what is encompassed by these 'protected, concerted activities,' see THE
DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 7, at 83-87.
67. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(b) to (g) (2009).
68. See id. § 158(b)(1) (prohibiting restraint or coercion of employees in exercise of section
7 rights); Id. at 158(b)(3) (refusal to bargain collectively, and in good faith); Id. at § 158(b)(4)
(prohibiting the use of 'secondary boycotts').
69. Elk Lumber Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 333, 338 (1950).
70. MEUI KENPO, art. 27, no. 1.
71. Id. at art. 28.
72. See KEIHO, art. 35, available at http://www.asianlii.org/jp/legis/laws/
pcl907an45ol907133/ ("An act performed in accordance with laws and regulations or in the
pursuit of lawful business is not punishable."); Labor Union Act, art. 1, no. 2, available at
http://www.jil.go.jp/ english/laborinfo/library/documents/llj_1aw2.pdf ("The provisions of
[KEIHO, art. 35] shall apply to collective bargaining and other acts of labor unions which are
justifiable and have been performed for the attainment of the purposes of the [Act], provided,
however, that in no case shall exercises of violence be construed as justifiable acts of labor
unions."); Id. at art. 8 ("An employer may not make a claim for damages against a labor union or
a union member for damages received through a strike or other acts of dispute which are
justifiable acts.").
73. SUGENO, supra note 7, at 548.
74. Id. at 549.
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employer's property rights, and violence is always improper.74 Moreover, a
dispute is only justifiable if it has collective bargaining as its object. As a
result, political strikes are unjustifiable, as are sympathy strikes. Unions
must wait until negotiations have begun before initiating a dispute.78 Similarly,
unions are required to give notice before initiating a dispute. 79 Although
Sugeno believes that dispute acts in violation of a no-strike or similar
agreement are generally unjustifiable, he acknowledges it to be a case-by-case
basis, and that there are opposing views.80
Although secondary actions are suspect, the Japanese have a broad
definition of what constitutes a primary action. If in the course of an industrial
dispute workers appeal to customers and the public not to purchase the products
of the struck employer, the action is considered a primary product boycott.
Such conduct is proper and justifiable because it is within the scope of the
protection accorded the dispute right.8
A dispute act is generally justifiable if it involves the total or partial
withholding of work.82 Among the acts Sugeno mentions as being generally
permissible are full strikes, partial strikes, "designated strikes," rolling strikes,
and limited-duration strikes. 3 This includes concerted vacation/sick-leave, and
refusals to come to/leave work at designated times, or refuse overtime. 84In
addition slowdowns that don't involve destruction or damage are permissible.
American labor law provides workers with a smaller array of economic
weapons for collective bargaining than Japanese labor law. American workers
are unprotected in partial work stoppages or slow-downs, while secondary
boycotts are prohibited. In Japan, workers can undertake such collective
actions as long as they are "justifiable" under Japan's Constitution and laws.86
As a result, American workers have fewer options for effectively imposing
costs on their employers for failure to agree with them in collective bargaining,
and thus less bargaining power than comparable workers under Japanese law.
75. Id. at 556.
76. Id. at 550.
77. Cf, id. at 550-51 (discussing an influential theory contending that strikes related to
legislation and policies concerning core economic interests, like working conditions and
organizational rights, are protected).
78. Cf, id. at 551-52 (discussing an opposing view that strikes are justifiable if the union
has a "substantial interest in the original dispute").
79. Id. at 554.
80. Id. But see Nihon Kakii, 17 Lab. Civ. Cases 102 (Tokyo Dist. Ct., Feb. 26, 1966)
(holding that although the union gave no notice, it may be considered proper because the
company could have foreseen its occurrence, immediate notice was given after the strike began,
and it was not the type of action that caused general paralysis of the business).
81. SUGENO, supra note 7, at 554-55.
82. Fukui Shinbunsha, 19 Lab. Civ. Cases 714 (Fukui Dist. Ct., May 15, 1968).
83. SUGENO, supra note 7, at 555.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. K. DAU-SCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 18, at 574-611.
87, SUGENO, supra note 7, at 555.
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This advantage in bargaining power for Japanese workers has probably
declined with the advent of the global economy. In the global economy, where
an employer can sub-contract work abroad, employee collective action of any
sort becomes more risky. However, consumer boycotts may be a viable union
weapon even in the global economy.
D. Employers' Economic Weapons
Employers in the United States have considerably more freedom to use
"economic weapons" as compared with their Japanese counterparts. In the
United States, employers are prohibited from firing striking employees.
However, under the "MacKay doctrine" economic strikers can be "permanently
replaced."8 7 Although strikers who have been permanently replaced have a
right to recall if openings occur and a right to vote in unit elections for up to
one year, permanent replacement has proven to be a very powerful weapon for
American employers in resisting and breaking unions. Although permanent
replacements were rarely implemented in the years immediately after the
adoption of the MacKay doctrine, American employers have shown an
increased willingness to resort to permanent replacements since the late
1970s.89 In addition, U.S. employers are permitted to resort to offensive
lockouts as a means of pressuring their employees to accept a collective
bargaining agreement on the employer's terms. It is not yet clear whether the
U.S. courts will allow employers to lockout their employees and replace
them.91
In Japan, employers have the "freedom to conduct operations" during
dispute acts, which grants a limited right to replace striking workers. The
Japanese Supreme Court is often quoted on the matter as saying "[e]ven during
a strike. . .an employer is not required to suspend the operation of its business,
and can take measures that are necessary to continue its operations in response
to the workers' dispute acts that seek to obstruct those operations."92 However,
88. See NLRB v. MacKay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
89. See, e.g., Jones Plastic & Eng'g Co., 351 N.L.R.B. 61, 67 (2007) (holding that
economic strikers need not be reinstated where the permanent replacements are at-will
employees who may be discharged at any time).
90. See James J. Brudney, To Strike or Not to Strike, 1999 Wis. L. REv. 65, 80-81 (1999)
(discussing the success of permanent replacements in the 1980s and 1990s in reducing the
number of strikes).
91. Am. Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 310 (1965) ("[W]e cannot see that the
employer's use of a lockout solely in support of a legitimate bargaining position is in any way
inconsistent with the right to bargain collectively or with the right to strike.").
92. But see NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 284 (1965) (holding to be lawful the lockout
and temporary replacement of workers belonging to a union local where a different employer in
a multi-employer bargaining unit was the subject of a strike by that local).
93. SUGENO, supra note 7, at 585 (quoting Sany6 Denki Kid6, Sup. Ct., 2nd Petty Bench,
Nov. 15, 1978, 32 Crim. Cases 1855). Sugeno also notes that some collective bargaining
agreements contain scab-prohibition provisions which would prohibit the employer from hiring
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while this principle permits employers to hire replacements, they may only do
so temporarily; even those Japanese workers who would be considered
"economic strikers" in the United States are entitled to reinstatement at the
conclusion of the strike.9 3
In addition to this limited replacement right, Japanese employers may
have the right to lockout employees under certain circumstances. In
Marushima Suimon, the Japanese Supreme Court stated that:
[I]n a particular labor dispute, the power balance between
workers and their employer collapses because of the workers'
dispute acts, and the employer is subjected to extraordinarily
disadvantageous pressures, the employer can prevent such
pressures in light of the fairness principle. The employer's
opposing defensive measures which are limited to restoring
the power balance between the workers and the employer will
be recognized . . . . They will also be approved as an
employer's proper dispute acts.94
Sugeno's position on the lockout is that it is a purely defensive right
allowing employers
to mitigate the financial burden created by extraordinary
adverse pressures produced by the worker conduct that hinders
their businesses. As a result, the principal requirement for
recognizing a lockout's propriety is that there be worker
obstruction of the business which causes unusual harm to an
employer, so that the employer will be in an extraordinarily
disadvantageous position if it cannot refuse to accept the work
of the disputing workers. 95
In addition, the only proper targets of a lockout are members of the
disputing union.
Because American employers are allowed greater resort to economic
weapons, they should have greater bargaining power than similarly situated
employers under Japanese law. The ability of American employers to
permanently replace economic strikers and undertake offensive lockouts in
replacements at all. Id. at 585-86.
94. Id. at 585 (see footnote titled "Reinstatement of Strikers").
95. Id. at 587 (quoting Sup. Ct., 3rd Petty Bench, Apr. 25, 1975, 29 Civ. Cases 481).
[A lockout] shall exempt the employer from the duty to pay wages ... if, in the
light of various circumstances such as the attitude taken in ... negotiations, their
progress, the forms of dispute acts engaged in by the union, and the extent of
their impact upon the employer, the lockout is viewed, from the perspective of
equity in labor-management relations, as a proper means of defending the
employer's business against the union's dispute acts.
Id. at 587.
96. Id. at 588.
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advance of employee collective action allows them to impose costs on
employees for not agreeing with them at the negotiating table and thus to wield
greater bargaining power in negotiations. An employer's ability to resort to
international out-sourcing in the new global economy has, if anything, probably
increased American employers' power in this regard.
E. The Structure of Negotiations
Although most of the factors we have discussed so far suggest that
Japanese unions should have greater bargaining power than similarly situated
American unions, the structure of negotiations in the United States probably
favor union power, while the structure of negotiations in Japan probably limits
the desire of Japanese employees to exercise the economic power they do have
over their employers.
American collective bargaining tends to be organized on an adversarial
basis across a larger regional area or national basis. American unions tend to
organize by trade or industry on a national basis. Moreover, in the structure
of industrial relations, American management is strongly allied with the
interests of shareholders and conducts collective bargaining through arms
length negotiations with the employees. Under American law, corporate
managers owe stockholders a fiduciary duty97 and generally have strong
financial rewards for maximizing returns to shareholders.98 Because of this, in
American corporations it is common for management to identify with
shareholder interests and view employee interests with some hostility as an
impediment to achieving corporate goals.
As a result of these structural characteristics of American industrial
relations, American labor unions tend to be relatively large organizations that
have the resources to maintain local unions in conflicts with individual
employers. Moreover, American unions do not share a strong community of
interest with any particular employer. Although American unions certainly
have no interest in bankrupting viable employers since their interests are less
often tied to the interests of a single employer, the unions have no problem
97. The largest union federation, the AFL-CIO, contains over fifty trade unions,
collectively representing eleven million workers. AFL-CIO, Union Facts,
http://www.aflcio.org/aboutus/faq/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2009). The next largest federation,
Change to Win, claims six million members through seven trade unions. Change to Win, About
Us, http://www.changetowin.org/about-us.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2009).
98. E.g., Koebler v. Black River Falls Iron Co., 67 U.S. (2 Black) 715, 720-21 (1862)
("[Directors] hold a place of trust, and by accepting the trust are obliged to execute it with
fidelity, not for their own benefit, but for the common benefit of the stockholders of the
corporation."); Richard Posner, Against Creative Capitalism, in CREATIVE CAPrrAUSM - A
CONVERSATION WiTH BILL GATEs, WARREN BUFFET, AND OTHER EcoNoMIC LEADERS (Michael
Kinsley ed., 2008) ("The managers of corporations have a fiduciary duty to maximize corporate
profits.").
99. Strong financial rewards often occur through contracts involving the use of
performance-based pay or equity options.
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employing strikes in whip-sawing strategies to bid up wages, or even driving
out inefficient low wage employers for the benefit of the majority of employees
- - 99in the union.
By contrast, Japanese unions typically organize at the enterprise level. To
the extent that industrial organizations exist, they are typically federations of
enterprise unions, rather than industry wide unions. oo These organizations are
relatively informal and have little or no power to control their affiliated unions.
They may be most effective in serving as a sort of coordinating committee for
industry wide strategy. 01 Moreover, in the structure of corporate governance
in Japan, shareholders exercise much less control over management and
management tends to be promoted from within the ranks of the firm's
employees. As a result, Japanese management is more likely to identify their
interests with those of their employees and secure capital merely by paying a
competitive rate of return in capital markets. This alignment of management
interests with employees, rather than shareholders, may account for a number of
differences in American and Japanese managerial practices such as the
dramatically higher levels of executive compensation in the United States and
American management's tendency to focus on short-run profits, even to the
long-run detriment of the firm.102
As a result, Japanese unions are organized on a smaller basis and owe
their allegiance to the interests of one employer. Moreover, the structure of
corporate governance in Japan promotes an alignment of management interests
with employee interests rather than shareholder interests. This stronger
community of interest among Japanese employees and employers is well
recognized in the literature. Because Japanese labor organizations are
organized on a smaller enterprise basis, this factor suggests that they will
exercise less bargaining power relative to their employers than similarly
situated American workers because they will not have larger organization to
financially support them in their disputes. Furthermore, the alignment of
100. See, e.g., Michael H. LeRoy, Lockouts Involving Replacement Workers: An Empirical
Public Policy Analysis and Proposal to Balance Economic Weapons Under the NLRA, 74
WASH. U. L.Q. 981, 1000-02 (1996).
101. HANAMI, supra note 51, at 105. The All Japan Seamen's Union (JSU) stands in
contrast as a true industrial union that had 150,000 members in 1979. Id The union's website
indicates that membership had declined to 40,000 in 1999. See All Japan Seamen's Union,
What is JSU?, http://www.jsu.or.jp/eng/eng.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2009).
102. HANAMI, supra note 51, at 106. There are a few large national organizations as well.
Hanami identified four very large organizations ranging from 500,000 to 2 million workers in
1979 that had been coordinating smaller unions in a 'spring offensive' for two decades. Id at
106-07. The tactics of these organizations varied, but they typically coordinate strategy and
plan actions on a national scale. Id. at 107.
103. I would like to thank Professor Nokobaku for extending his insightful comments to this
paper at the RIETI conference in Tokyo, Japan, held July 15, 2008.
104. E.g., Takashi Araki, Convergence or Divergence? A Comparative Analysis ofSecurity,
Flexibility, and Decentralized Industrial Relations in Japan, 28 CoMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 443,
450-51 (2007).
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interests between labor and management within Japanese firms means that
collective bargaining is conducted on a less adversarial basis.' Even if
Japanese workers do have greater access to economic weapons than American
workers, they are less likely to have to use them to resolve disputes. Japanese
employees who are organized on an enterprise basis certainly have no incentive
to engage in whip-sawing strikes among employers to bid up wages or to drive
inefficient low wage employers out of the market.
V. CONCLUSION
The balance of bargaining power between labor and management varies
according to underlying economic parameters and the laws governing the
conduct of collective bargaining. A party's bargaining power, or its ability to
induce the other side to accept an agreement on its terms, depends on that
party's ability to impose costs on the other side for failing to agree and to avoid
or absorb its own costs from failing to agree. Each party's ability to impose and
avoid costs depends on economic factors, such as the nature of the firm's
product, the firm's technology of production, general economic conditions, the
structure of bargaining, and the employees' commitment to collective action.
However, the parties' ability to impose and avoid costs also depends on the
legal framework for collective bargaining, the legal structure of bargaining and
the economic weapons that each side is allowed.
The rise of the global economy and new information technology has
significantly decreased the bargaining power of unions relative to employers.
New information technology has allowed the organization and distribution of
production on a global basis, subjecting all facets of the firm to market
discipline and low wage competition in the global economy. This fundamental
change facilitates the relocation of production to low wage countries, putting
downward pressure on wages in the industrialized countries and raising the
possible costs of employee collective action.
The United States and Japan's labor laws also create differences in the
relative bargaining power of unions and management. It seems clear that
Japan's system of plural unionism facilitates the organization of employees by
increasing union density and bargaining power. However, in industries where
unions are well established, the United States' system of exclusive
representation simplifies representation and bargaining issues and insulates
unions from competition. With respect to economic weapons, the United States
restricts employee collective action while allowing employers greater latitude in
economic warfare. American employees are prohibited from engaging in
secondary boycotts and are unprotected in partial work stoppages or slow-
downs, while American employers can permanently replace economic strikers
and undertake offensive lockouts. In Japan, employees are protected in
undertaking "justified" collective action, including boycotts and partial strikes
105. Id.
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or slow downs, and employers are constrained from making permanent
replacement or offensive lockouts. This imbalance in economic weapons
suggests that, relative to Japanese employers, American employers can impose
greater costs on their employees for refusing to agree and thus enjoy greater
relative bargaining power. Finally, and perhaps most importantly from a
practical perspective, in the structure of bargaining American employees enjoy
larger labor organizations that tend to bargain on a multi-enterprise basis. As a
result they can better support local unions in disputes with individual
employers. Moreover, the organization of Japanese unions on an enterprise
basis and the greater community of interest between labor and management in
Japan means that even if Japanese workers enjoy greater legal access to
economic weapons, they are less likely to need or want to resort to those
weapons to resolve disputes.

